formulation of state guidelines, and concludes that sound public policy requires that the interests of the accused be placed above those of the broadcasters. Part III discusses the manner in which the states have resolved these difficult constitutional and policy questions, noting those resolutions that best accommodate the principles outlined in Parts I and II. Part III also discusses the desirability of promulgating a uniform set of guidelines for application by the states. States are then invited to adopt the model set of guidelines proposed in the Appendix. 9 I. CONSTITUTIONAL PARAMETERS The Supreme Court has had two occasions to address the question of whether the televising of a state criminal trial violates the defendant's fourteenth amendment right to due process oflaw. In 1965, the Court held in Estes v. Texas 10 that the circus-like atmosphere created by broadcasters in the courtroom deprived the defendant of due process. I I Indeed, in reversing Estes' conviction for swindling, four members of the five-Justice majorityI 2 endorsed the principle that the televising of criminal trials, at least under the technology prevailing at the time, I3 amounted to a per se violation of due process. I 4 It was not until 1981 that the Court once again considered the question, this time in a case in which Florida's guidelines for televising 9 . Judge Murray Richtel of the Twentieth Judicial District of Colorado is currently drafting a similar set of guidelines for the National Conference of State Trial Judges. He is chairman of the News Reporting and Fair Trial Committee, Subcommittee on Model Rules for Expanded Media Coverage.
10. 381 U. S. 532 (1965) . 11. During the pretrial hearing to consider whether the trial would be televised: [A]t least 12 cameramen were engaged in the courtroom throughout the hearing.taking motion and still pictures and televising the proceedings. cables and wires were snaked across the courtroom floor, three microphones were on the judge's bench and others were beamed at the jury box and the counsel table. It is conceded that the activities of the television crews and news photographers led to considerable disruption of the hearings. 381 U.S. at 536.
12. Justice Harlan concurred only in the result. He refused to find that cameras in the courtroom inherently violated the defendant's due process rights. 381 U.S. at 590 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("The probable impact of courtroom television on the fairness of a trial may vary according to the particular kind of case involved."). 13. The Court placed great emphasis on the fact that given the state of technology that existed at the time, television was inherently disruptive of the trial process. 381 U.S. at 544 ("Television in its present state and by its very nature, reaches into a variety of areas in which it may cause prejudice to an accused."), 551-52 ("It is said that the ever-advancing techniques of public communication and the adjustment of the public to its presence may bring about a change in the effect of telecasting upon the fairness of criminal trials. But we are not dealing here with future developments in the field of electronics.").
14. The majority opinion acknowledged that "in most cases involving claims of due process deprivations .
•. [the Court requires] a showing of identifiable prejudice to the accused." 381 U.S. at 542. In Estes, proof of actual prejudice was lacking. Nevertheless, the Court observed that "at times a procedure employed by the State involves such a probability that prejudice will result that it is deemed inherently lacking in due process." 381 U.S. at 542-43. The broadcasting of criminal trials, the Court held, was just such a procedure. 381 U.S. at 544. [Vol. 84:475 trials were in use. In Chandler v. Florida, 15 the Supreme Court affirmed a burglary conviction despite the fact that the trial was televised. In so doing, the Court stated that it was not overruling Estes. 16 Instead, the Court relied on Justice Harlan's concurrence in Estes, which it interpreted to hold that cameras in the courtroom violated due process only if the trial was in fact compromised by the television coverage. 17 In Estes, the Chandler Court observed, the fairness of the trial had been compromised by the television coverage. 18 By contrast, the defendant in Chandler was unable to demonstrate that the presence of cameras in the courtroom had actually interfered with his right to receive a fair trial. t9 In upholding the conviction of Chandler, the Supreme Court adopted a states' rights position concerning the broadcasting of state criminal trials. 20 While it refused to hold that television coverage is constitutionally prohibited, 21 the Court also refused to hold that television coverage is constitutionally mandated. 22 The Court, declining to "endorse or to invalidate" Florida's guidelines, 23 merely ruled that states should be free to experiment and develop their own court rules in this area. 24 In taking this position, the Court referred the entire issue to the states, thus depriving them of guidance as to when the Court would consider the psychological and physical disturbances caused by broadcasters in the courtroom a due process violation. 25 15. 449 U. S. 560 (1981) .
16. 449 U.S. at 573 (''Estes is not to be read as announcing a constitutional rule barring still photographic, radio, and television coverage in all cases and under all circumstances.").
17. 449 U.S. at 581-82; see also note 12 supra. 18. 449 U.S. at 582; see note 11 supra.
19. 449 U.S. at 577-82.
20. See 449 U.S. at 578 ("Examination and reexamination, by state courts, of the in-court presence of the electronic news media, vel non, is an exercise of authority reserved to the states under our federalism.") (quoting Brief for Conference of Chief Justices as Amicus Curiae at 2).
For a discussion of the Chaniiler decision and its reliance on federalism principles, see Comment, From Estes to Chandler: Shifting the Constitutional Burden of Courtroom Cameras to tlze States, 9 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 315 (1981) . According to the author, the Court in Clzandler acknowledges the right of the accused to a fair trial but "assigns considerably more importance to the states' right to experiment than it does to the fair trial right of the accused." Id. at 328 (citation omitted). The author explains the victory for states' rights embodied in Clzandler as consistent with "the pattern established by the Burger Court of de-federalizing criminal procedure as a step toward correcting 'a dangerous imbalance' which accords too much constitutional protection to criminals and too little to their victims and to society at large." Id. at 335 (citing Burger, Annual Report to the American Bar Association by the Chief Justice of the United States, 67 A.B.A. J. 290, 291 (1981) However, an examination of other Supreme Court decisions, not involving televised trials, sheds light on the proper weight that should be afforded the conflicting constitutional interests implicated in the cameras in the courtroom debate. One of the constitutional provisions at issue in the cameras in the courtroom controversy is, of course, the first amendment. In short, the relevant question is whether the first amendment guarantees broadcasters the "right" to inform the public through the televising of criminal trials. As the case law now stands, the answer to this question is clearly no. In light of Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 26 this answer may seem somewhat surprising. In Richmond Newspapers, the Court held that the first amendment provides the public and the print media a right of access to state criminal trials. 27 Noting that the first amendment was adopted against a backdrop of open public trials, the Court enunciated in broad terms the benefits of admitting the public and the print media -an open trial is more likely to be conducted fairly, participants are more inclined to honesty, and community outrage and concern tends to be channeled away from "vengeful self-help." 28 The Supreme Court has failed to articulate reasons for treating the electronic media differently from the print media in the courtroom context. However, the Court has repeatedly noted distinctions between the media that have persuaded it to uphold regulation of the broadcast media and strike down as unconstitutional similar regulation of the print media. 29 While the Court's decisions in this area are new guidelines for resolving the constitutional stand-off between the free press guarantee of the first amendment and the fair trial guarantee of the sixth amendment are offered." Id.; see also State and Federal Courts, 18 GA. L. REv. 389, 400 (1984) ("Critical weaknesses in the Chandler decision have prevented the formulation of broad constitutional guidelines for the determination of when due process is threatened by the presence of cameras in a criminal trial."}.
Note, An Assessment of the Use of Cameras in
26. 448 U. S. 555 (1980) . 27. Chief Justice Burger, in a plurality opinion joined by Justices White and Stevens, and Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion, concluded that the constitutional right of access to criminal trials applies to both the public and the press. 448 U.S. at 576-77, 599. Justices Brennan and Marshall, concurring in the judgment, described the right of access granted by the first amendment as belonging to the public. 448 U.S. at 585. The Court discussed Richmond Newspapers in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) :
Our recent decision in Richmond Newspapers firmly established for the first time that the press and general public have a constitutional right of access to criminal trials. Although there was no opinion of the Court in that case, seven Justices recognized that this right of access is embodied in the First Amendment and applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. 457 U.S. at 603 (citation omitted}; cf. Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Morphonios, 467 So. 2d 1026 , 1029 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985 ("[T] here is no first amendment protection of the rights of the public and the press to attend pretrial hearings, as distinguished from the right to attend a criminal trial.") (citation omitted [Vol. 84:475 noteworthy in illustrating an historical reluctance to confer first amendment protections upon television, none of these distinctions particularly relates to courtroom access.
While its rationale for treating the broadcast and print media differently in the courtroom context is unclear, the Court in Chandler left little doubt that it is unprepared to recognize a first amendment right of access for broadcasters. In Chandler, the Court was faced with a Florida Supreme Court holding that "pointedly rejected" the assertion that there exists a "federal constitutional right of access on the part of photographers or the broadcast media to televise or electronically record and thereafter disseminate court proceedings." 30 This holding provided the Court with a clear opportunity to extend its decision in Richmond Newspapers to the broadcast media. Yet, the Court neatly avoided the issue by deciding that the television coverage in Chandler, whether mandated by the constitution or not, did not violate the defendant's right to due process. 31 The Court's reluctance to embrace the opportunity to extend Richmond Newspapers, coupled with its tolerance of the ban on television in the federal system, is strong evidence that the Court is unwilling to posit a constitutional right of access on the part of broadcasters. 3 2 While the Supreme Court has been avoiding a definitive decision on the first amendment issue, the lower federal courts have been consistently holding that the first amendment does not guarantee the electronic media a right to televise trials 33 or the public a right to view dates), and Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding the fairness doctrine as applied to broadcasters by the FCC), and National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190 (1943) Ares, Chandler v. Florida: Television, Criminal Trials, and Due Process, 1981 SuP. Cr. REV. 157, 175-78, which argues that the Court in Chandler was not faced with the question of whether television has a first amendment right of access, and that when it is forced to address the issue, it should extend Richmond to include a right of access for the broadcast media.
But cf
" [T] here do not seem to be any grounds on which television can be denied the same right of access that Richmond Newspapers upholds for the public and the press." Id. at 177. (1982) . Cosmos Broadcasting implies that a limited first amendment right of television access does exist:
[U]nder the First Amendment, the concept of equal access to courtroom proceedings and the effective reporting of courtroom events means at least this: unless there is an overriding consideration to the contrary, clearly articulated in the trial court's findings, representatives of the electronic news media must be allowed to bring their technology with them into the courtroom, even if only to a small degree (e.g., a single camera .•• ).
trials on television. 34 Courts have also upheld the denial of camera access to courtrooms as a legitimate time, place, and manner restriction. 35 They contend that the prohibition of cameras does not foreclose the public's right to learn about trials through other media sources or personal attendance and reject the argument that such a restriction unfairly discriminates between newspapers and television. 36 The federal courts' reluctance to find a first amendment right of access for broadcasters in the context of state criminal trials may well be explained by the necessary consequences of such a holding on the 34. Recently, the Second Circuit stated: There is a long leap ... between a public right under the First Amendment to attend trials and a public right under the First Amendment to see a given trial televised. It is a leap that is not supported by history. It is a leap that we are not yet prepared to take.
Westmoreland v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984 ), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3478 (1985 .
35. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 578, 581 n.18; 448 U.S. at 600 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("Just as a legislature may impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions upon the exercise of First Amendment freedoms, so may a trial judge impose reasonable limitations upon the unrestricted occupation of a courtroom by representatives of the press and members of the public."). Cases applying this reasoning to justify the exclusion of cameras from the courtroom include Westmoreland v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 752 F.2d 16, 24-25 (2d Cir. 1984 Proceedings in court should be conducted with. fitting dignity and decorum. The taking of photographs in the cou11room, during sessions of the court or recesses between sessions, and the broadcasting of court proceedings are calculated to detract from the essential dignity of the proceedings, degrade the court and create misconceptions with respect thereto in the mind of the public and should not be permitted. -Canon 35 (1937) A judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising, recording, or taking photographs in the courtroom and areas immediately adjacent thereto during sessions of court or recesses between sessions, except that a judge may authorize: (a) the use of electronic or photographic means for the presentation of evidence, for the perpetuation of a record, or for other purposes of judicial administration; (b) the broadcasting, televising, recording, or photographing of investitive, ceremonial, or naturalization proceedings; (c) the photographic or electronic recording and reproduction of appropriate court proceedings under the following conditions: (i) the means of recording will not distract participants or impair the dignity of the proceedings; (ii) the parties have consented, and the consent to being depicted or recorded has been obtained from each witness appearing in the recording and reproduction;
CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS
1984, the Judicial Conference rejected a petition from twenty-eight radio, television, newspaper, and related media organizations proposing to amend canon 3A(7) and rule 53 to facilitate media access to courtroom proceedings. 40 Given this reluctance to allow television access to federal courts, it is doubtful that the Supreme Court4 1 would hold that broadcasters have a first amendment right of access to judicial proceedings.
In arguing for the right to photograph and televise criminal trials, broadcasters have not relied solely on the first amendment. In addition, they have pointed to the sixth amendment's grant of a "public trial" 42 as an independent justification for permitting television coverage of courtroom proceedings. This argument has been rejected, however, on the ground that the sixth amendment right to a public trial belongs to the accused rather than the public. 43 In Nixon v. Warner (iii) the reproduction will not be exhibited until after the proceeding has been concluded and all direct appeals have been exhausted; and (iv) the reproduction will be exhibited only for instructional purposes in educational institutions. ·
Commentary:
Temperate conduct of judicial proceedings is essential to the fair administration of justice. The recording and reproduction of a proceeding should not distort or dramatize the proceeding.
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(7) (1972) , reprinted in RTNDA, supra note 3, at A-1 to A-2. The 1982 revision of canon 3A(7) reads as follows: A judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising, recording or photographing in courtrooms and areas immediately adjacent thereto during sessions of court, or recesses between sessions, except that under rules prescribed by a supervising appellate court or other appropriate authority, a judge may authorize broadcasting, televising, recording and photographing of judicial proceedings in courtrooms and areas immediately adjacent thereto consistent with the right of the parties to a fair trial and subject to express conditions, limitations, and guidelines which allow such coverage in a manner that will be unobtrusive, will not distract the trial participants, and will not otherwise interfere with the administration of justice. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(7) (1984 REv. l, 5 (1960) ("The public trial exists because of the aversion which liberty-loving people have toward secret trials and proceedings. That is the reason our courts are open to the public, not because the framers wanted to provide the public with [Vol. 84:475 Communications, the Supreme Court did suggest that the guarantee of a public trial assures the public and press the "opportunity" to attend a trial and report on what they observe. 44 The Court made clear, however, that this limited access to the courtroom was designed to ensure that the accused was not tried and persecuted in secret. 4 s The "opportunity" of the public and the press to attend the trial was considered enough to avert this danger; beyond this, the sixth amendment did not require "that [a] trial -or any part of it -be broadcast live or on tape to the public."46
The sixth amendment's grant of a "public trial," then, is primarily a guarantee that a criminal defendant will be "fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned." 47 In this respect, the amendment is largely duplicative of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment; 48 both provisions operate to protect the accused against unfair trial procedures. 49 538-39 (1965) . 48. For a good example of a due process violation attributable to improper media activity, see Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) . In Maxwell, the "carnival" atmosphere created by the media made it impossible for the defendant to receive a fair trial:
The fact is that bedlam reigned at the courthouse during the trial and newsmen took over practically the entire courtroom, hounding most of the participants in the trial, especially Sheppard. At a temporary table within a few feet of the jury box and counsel table sat some 20 reporters staring at Sheppard and taking notes. The erection of a press table for reporters inside the bar is unprecedented. The bar of the court is reserved for counsel, providing them a safe place in which to keep papers and exhibits, and to confer privately with a client and co-counsel. It was designed to protect the witness and the jury from any distractions, intrusions or influences, and to permit bench discussions of the judge's rulings away from the hearing of the public and the jury. Having assigned almost all of the available seats in the courtroom to the news media, the judge lost his ability to supervise that environment. The movement of the reporters in and out of the courtroom caused frequent confusion and disruption of the trial. And the record reveals constant commotion within the bar. Moreover, the judge gave the throng of newsmen gathered in the corridors of the courthouse absolute free rein. Participants in the trial, including the jury, were forced to run a gauntlet of reporters and photographers each time they entered or left the courtroom. 384 U.S. at 355. A similar "circus" atmosphere prevailed in Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
See note 11 supra.
49. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539-40 (1965) (both the due process clause and the sixth amendment "require a procedure that will assure a fair trial").
50. 381 U.S. at 538-44.
51. See notes 26-46 supra and accompanying text.
cameras in their courtrooms only if they take steps to protect the defendant's due process and sixth amendment rights to a fair trial. 52 It is only within the parameters of these constitutional principles that states are free to fashion guidelines governing the use of cameras in their courtrooms. The Court's assignment of greater weight to the defendant's interests than those of the media must serve as a backdrop for all decisions regarding particular guideline provisions. While there may be first amendment values served by television coverage, state guidelines must ensure that a defendant's constitutional rights are never threatened in an effort to serve them.
II. CONFLICTING INTERESTS
Part I described the constitutional parameters within which the states must operate in regulating television access to criminal trials. Within these parameters, however, the states have considerable discretion to regulate the manner in which cameras are (or are not) utilized in their courtrooms. The following section seeks to identify those policy interests that the states should consider in promulgating guidelines for the use of cameras in their criminal justice systems.
A. Reasons to Limit Televised Trials

Assuring an Untainted Trial
The physical and psychological disturbances associated with televising a trial have been held to be so bothersome as to violate the defendant's sixth amendment and due process rights. 53 However, televising in compliance with Florida's guidelines, which impose minimal restraints on broadcasters, 54 was upheld in Chandler v. Florida as not violative of due process. 55 Thus, it is likely that televising under other state guidelines, more protective of the defendant, would also be held constitutional. But even when the psychological and physical distractions caused by cameras do not amount to a constitutional violation, they are still undesirable and should be minimized as a matter of policy.
Television equipment and accompanying activity can physically distract trial participants. The Supreme Court in Estes stated that disturbances caused by cumbersome equipment, cables, lighting, and 54. Florida's guidelines, which were adopted in Fla. Report, supra note 3, are in many respects less restrictive than those of other states. For example, guidelines in Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Minnesota, Oklahoma, and Tennessee require the defendant's consent as a precondition to televising. RTNDA, supra note 3, at B-10. In addition, 18 states prohibit coverage of certain types of sensitive proceedings. Id. at B-19 to B-25. Florida's guidelines contain neither of these restrictions.
55. See notes 15-25 supra and accompanying text. [Vol. 84:475 camera technicians prejudiced the trial. 56 The Court in Chandler argued that advanced technology has greatly reduced these distractions. 57 While technology has certainly streamlined televising, as long as a camera is in the courtroom, some disruption is likely to remain. 58 The psychological distractions that accompany broadcasting are not as easily measurable or preventable and are potentially more damaging. 59 The knowledge that the trial is being televised, it is argued, may diminish the jury's attentiveness, 60 frighten timid witnesses, 61 and cause judges and lawyers to behave differently than they ordinarily would. 62 910, 925 (1978) ("Modem television cameras can be operated noiselessly, without the need for additional lighting, and no longer pose a source of distraction to those present.") (citation omitted).
58. Guidelines can serve to minimize these disturbances. Examples of state restrictions to minimize physical distractions include the following: "Only equipment-that does not produce distracting sound or light shall be employed to cover judicial proceedings .... No motorized drives shall be permitted, and no moving lights, flash attachments, or sudden lighting changes shall be permitted during court proceedings." CAL. Ctv. & CRIM. Cr. R. CODE, Ruic
980.2(h)(2)(i) (West 1981).
Reports from states that impose guidelines designed to limit noise have found such rules to be S. 532, 565, 578-80 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concurring). For an example of another celebrated case in which psychological distractions were held to contribute to a denial of due process, see the discussion of Sheppard v. Maxwell at note 48 supra.
The Chandler Court correctly acknowledged that there is a lack of empirical evidence concerning the psychological effects that cameras have on defendants, witnesses, and jurors. 64 Lacking sufficient evidence that cameras inherently burden the judicial process, the Court refused to interfere with state experimentation in this area. 65 An equally plausible and more cautious response would have been to curb or even deny camera access until sufficient data could be accumulated as to its effects. The Court supported its decision by noting that none of the state experiments were able to show that electronic coverage consistently created psychological distractions. 66 The surveys done in those reports, however, consisted in part of asking jurors after trial whether they felt that the presence of cameras distracted them and prevented them from making a fair decision. 67 It is unlikely that jurors after a trial would concede that they were unable, for any reason, to reach a fair, rational decision in the case.
The psychological effects on witnesses of courtroom distractions · have been considered a serious enough threat to the fair administration of justice to justify excluding spectators from the courtroom during the testimony of particular witnesses. People v. Smith, 90 Mich. App. 20, 282 N.W.2d 277 (1979) (dictum hypothesizing that in a trial for criminal sexual conduct, defendant could not prevent media from attending proceedings had media objected to exclusion). [Vol. 84:475 These orders have been upheld as valid discretionary decisions made in part to ensure that the courtroom atmosphere does not inhibit a witness from fully disclosing his or her information. If such concerns at times support excluding the public and the print media from the courtroom, they certainly justify restricting or even excluding the television medium, where the risk that negative psychological reactions may inhibit complete and honest testimony is even greater. 71
Protecting Privacy
A second justification for limiting the televising of criminal trials is the privacy interests of the defendant. To be sure, the defendant has no absolute "right" of privacy in the events that transpire in a courtroom. 364, 378, 679 P.2d 353, 361 (1984) (the press has an absolute right accurately to publish and broadcast lawfully obtained information that is a matter of public record); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, comment b (1977) ("There is no liability when the defendant merely gives further publicity to information about the plaintiff that is already public. Thus there is no liability for giving publicity to facts about the plaintiff's life that are matters of public record .... "). But see Comment, First Amendment Limitations on Public Disclosure Actions, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 180, 189-90 (1977) .
One student commentator has expressed a contrary view, arguing that judicial proceedings are not in fact public events:
Buttressing the result dictated by its first two grounds of decision, the Court [in Cox] argued that, as recognized by the common law public records defense to a privacy action, there is no substantial privacy interest in information already on the public record. Although the Court was less than explicit, the argument seems to be that because no legitimate privacy interests are infringed by giving publicity to public information, it is unconstitutional to impose sanctions on the press for printing such information, regardless of its importance.
This argument rests on a false premise. Although it is true that a public disclosure action lies only if the facts disclosed are not widely known, it is disingenuous to suggest that all facts on the public record are public facts, in the sense that they are known to a substantial number of people. Giving publicity to little-known facts in the public record may appreciably affect individual privacy.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
However, in Cox the Court acknowledged that there may be privacy interests in need of protection in the courtroom. It went on to observe that a valid way to protect such interests is to avoid public documentation or other exposure of private information. 74 Many state and federal courts have done just that, closing entire trials (or portions thereof) to the public and press to protect witnesses from unnecessary pressures or embarrassment and to maintain order in the courtroom. 75 Several states acknowledge the privacy interest as a real concern in the cam-74. 420 U.S. at 496 ("If there are privacy interests to be protected in judicial proceedings, the States must respond by means which avoid public documentation or other exposure of private information. Their political institutions must weigh the interests in privacy with the interests of the public to know and of the press to publish.") (footnote omitted); see also Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Assn., 4 Cal. 3d 529, 541, 483 P.2d 34, 42, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866, 874 (1971) 33, 38 (Fla. 1958 ) (Upholding, against claims of first amendment freedom of press, a court order prohibiting photography during the arraignment of a defendant indicted for rape. Without actually so holding the court indicated that the validity of the order would also have been upheld on the ground that it was a legitimate measure to protect the right of privacy of the defendant.), 108 So. 2d 33, 37 ("[P]ortions of the proceedings assume the aspects of a private event in connection with which attendance and conduct could reasonably be restricted or controlled ... . ");Ex Parte Strum, 152 Md. 114, 136 A. 312 (1927) (order excluding photographers is necessary in part to preserve the dignity and decorum of the courtroom and did not infringe upon freedom of the press); Commonwealth v. Hobbs, 385 Mass. 863, 868, 434 N.E.2d 633, 638 (1982) ("Judges may exclude spectators from the courtroom when necessary to protect witnesses, shelter confidential information, or maintain order.") (citation omitted); Mack Appeal, 386 Pa. 251, 126 A.2d 679 (1956) (upholding a court rule prohibiting taking photographs in courtrooms in part on the ground that criminal defendants have a "right of privacy" which courts have an inherent duty to safeguard), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1002 (1957); State v. Sinclair, 275 S.C. 608, 614, 274 S.E.2d 411, 414 (1981) ("The public was excluded only while the prosecuting witness testified. . . . The primary reason for the order was to shield the witness, a young girl nine years of age, from public scrutiny while she was recounting the details of an embarrassing and sensitive incident."). For a general discussion of the various tests used to determine if a trial should be closed to the public, see 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 22.1 (1984) . The authors cite Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596 (1982) , in which the Court held unconstitutional on first amendment grounds a Massachusetts statute mandating closure of every trial involving sex offenses with minors. Although the Court invalidated the Massachusetts statute, it made clear that the first amendment does not necessarily bar exclusion from the courtroom of the press and public in such cases. Instead, the exclusion decision must be made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the state interest in "the protection of minor victims of sex crimes from further trauma and embarrassment .... " 457 U.S. at 607. [Vol. 84:475 eras in the courtroom debate. Arizona, for example, explicitly recognizes that the trial participants' interest in privacy is an important element in the decision whether to allow cameras. 76 The report of the District of Columbia Bar on cameras in the courtroom, in recommending that certain highly sensitive trials not be televised, argues that in such instances the privacy "rights" of the parties outweigh the public's interest in access by the electronic media. 77 Courts and commentators have thus accepted that privacy invasion is a compelling reason to prohibit the broadcasting of certain evidence.
Opponents of cameras in the courtroom argue that the privacy interests of trial participants are more easily threatened by the broadcast than by the print media, 78 and that exclusion of cameras may therefore be legitimate even when exclusion of the press is not. This contention is based on the assumption that the electronic media are different from the print media in both their nature and their impact on the public. Although the issue is debated, 79 there is strong evidence supporting the existence of this difference. For one, the evidence suggests that television is a more pervasive medium than newsprint. Reports show that television is the number one source of news across the nation. 80 A 1981 study revealed that ninety-eight percent of American homes have a television set and the average family watches television 6.9 hours a day. 81 In contrast, only twenty-three percent of Americans buy a morning newspaper and only thirty-one percent purchase an evening paper. 82 This suggests that the televising of a trial would provide for more widespread public exposure than a newspaper description.
Avoiding Burdens on Judicial Management
The added activities of broadcasting create new problems requiring 76. See ARIZ. CoDE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(7) (b) 
The Questionable Educational Benefits of Televising Criminal Trials
It is often asserted that cameras in the courtroom help to educate the public on the workings of our criminal justice system. 86 However, it is questionable whether televised trials actually serve as a useful educational tool. According to the Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Cameras in the Courtroom, media coverage of state court proceedings has not resulted in increased public understanding of the courts. 87 Rather than educating the public, the manner of televising has often resulted in miseducation and a distortion of the trial. In Chandler, for example, the television stations broadcast merely two minutes and fifty-five seconds of the trial and showed only excerpts from the prosecution's direct examination and closing statements. 88 Such an abbreviated and one-sided presentation leads to more distortion and miseducation than education. 89 Moreover, reports show that television is regarded as a more believable medium than. newspapers, 89. See also MINN. REPORT, supra note 6, at 17 (finding "no evidence of any meaningful educational and informational value to the public from the limited and unbalanced coverage that is characteristic of presenting video and audio coverage under current commercial television news formats for such coverage").
[Vol. 84:475 radio, and magazines. 90 This fact makes such one-sided and incomplete programming even more dangerous.
Media self-regulation could conceivably cure this disturbing problem of distortion. However, the broadcast media, unlike other professions, do not operate under a sophisticated system of ethical codes. 91 Accordingly, stringent state guidelines are needed to ensure that broadcasters present trials in a representative and unbiased manner.
B. The Interest in Uninhibited Television Access: First Amendment Values
While broadcasters have not been granted a first amendment right to televise trials, 92 such televising serves many first amendment values. The traditional arguments given for public trials 93 also support televised trials. Media access advances public awareness of the judicial system and its current proceedings, facilitates judicial oversight, and permits community catharsis. 94 In addition, the unique nature of the television medium offers other benefits beyond those provided simply by opening the courtroom to the public and press. Televised trials, if broadcast in an undistorted fashion, can educate the public about its judicial system, thus satisfying the public's constitutional "right to know." Although in theory each citizen is entitled to attend trial proceedings, 95 practicalities such as the small size of a courtroom and the limited amount of time individuals can devote to attending trials mean that, unaided by the media, the public is likely to remain relatively ignorant of the activities that transpire in a courtroom. In addition to teaching the public about courtroom procedure, televising trials provides information about public issues. The broadcasting of criminal trials, such as rape and murder cases, increases public awareness of many serious problems in society. 96 Televised proceedings also aid in public oversight of the judiciary. According to former Justice Potter Stewart, " [t] he primary purpose of the constitutional guarantee of a free press was ... to create a fourth institution outside Government as an additional check on the three 96. In a well publicized case, in which six men were charged with raping a woman on a barroom pool table in New Bedford, Massachusetts, a cable network televised large portions of the trial. Although the head of Women Organized Against Rape complained that the coverage might discourage other victims from reporting rapes, she admitted that the publicity could also be helpful in focusing public attention on the problem of sexual assaults and the rights of victims. he press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism." 98 A third benefit gained from televised trials has been described as a "community therapeutic value." 99 Criminal acts often provoke public outrage and the urge to retaliate. I 00 Opening the criminal justice system to the public through television provides an outlet for such community hostility.IOI In addition, this hostility may be abated somewhat when the public is shown that justice is being done. Televising trials may thus serve a prophylactic purpose and reduce the probability that the public will take the law into its own hands. Io 2 Lastly, the unique nature of the electronic media enables them to serve these functions in ways the print media cannot. The print media are unable to convey as accurately as television the witnesses' demeanor and the overall atmosphere of the courtroom. I 03 In addition, the pervasiveness of television I04 makes it a superior device to disseminate information about a trial. 100. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1984) ("Criminal acts, especially violent crimes, often provoke public concern, even outrage and hostility; this in turn generates a community urge to retaliate and desire to have justice done."); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980) ("When a shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of outrage and public protest often follows."); T. REIK, Foregiveness and Vengeance, in THE COMPULSION TO CoNFESS 408 (1959) (stating that human beings have a "truly unquenchable need for vengeance").
Friendly, CNN Plans to Cover Sex
101. See Pres~-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 509 (1984) ("when the public is aware that the law is being enforced and the criminal justice system is functioning, an outlet is provided for these understandable reactions and emotions"); Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980) ("the open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion").
102. See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980) (expressing concern that, without public access to criminal trials, "natural human reactions of outrage and protest are frustrated and may manifest themselves in some form of vengeful self-help").
103. Cf. Hendricks v. Swenson, 456 F.2d 503, 506 (8th Cir. 1972) (use of videotaped confession is superior to a written statement because jury could tell if defendant was hesitant or uncertain). But see Note, supra note 61, at 1554 (arguing that the presence of cameras can create witness nervousness that a jury might erroneously interpret as uncertainty or dishonesty).
See text at notes 80-82 supra.
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C. Maintaining a Proper Balance
The preceding discussion has attempted to sketch the policy arguments both in favor and against cameras in the courtroom. While there are clearly first amendment values promoted by televised trials, there is also the potential danger that trial participants will be prejudiced and judicial integrity undermined: Interests in privacy, fairness, judicial efficiency and even public education necessitate that strict limitations be imposed on those broadcasters permitted to televise criminal trials. 105 Traditional notions of the place of criminal trials in our society further support limitations on cameras in the courtroom. The primary purpose of a criminal trial is to provide the defendant with an impartial forum in which the truth will emerge, 106 not to educate or entertain the public. 431, 442 (1984) (Feldman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("In those exceptional cases in which we are forced to choose between First and Sixth Amendment rights, the balance weighs most in favor of the Sixth Amendment when the information withheld is information which may subject jurors to influence, prejudice or pressure which may affect jury deliberations. The trial court's power in the balance between First Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights is therefore at its greatest when dealing with jury problems. It may even impose regulations that prevent the press from obtaining the names and addresses of the jurors."); State v. Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc., 395 So. 2d 544, 549 (Fla. 1981) ("[I]t remains essential for trial judges to err on the side of fair trial rights for both the state and the defense. The electronic media's presence in Florida's courtrooms is desirable but not indispensable."); MINN. REPORT, supra note 6, at 9 ("The Commissioners, petitioners and the opponents of video and audio coverage of trial court proceedings who appeared before the Commission as "Interested Parties" all accept the fact that, where a likelihood exists of a conflict between the rights of a litigant to a fair and public trial and the desire of the media for video and audio coverage of the proceedings, the former must prevail."); Note, supra note 57, at 929; Comment, The Prejudicial Effects of Cameras ill the Courtroom, 16 U. RICH. L. REv. 867, 874-76 (1981-82) . See gellerally Patzer, Cameras ill the Courtroom: The Ka11Sas Oppositioll, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 230 (1978-79) (discussing the balancing process between sixth and first amendment interests in having media present in the courtroom).
Others believe that a balance in favor of the defendant is less obvious. In Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), Justice Black stated that "free speech and fair trials are two of the most cherished policies of our civilization, and it would be a trying task to choose between them." 314 U.S. at 260.
106. See Douglas, supra note 43, at 2-3 ("The courtroom by our traditions is a quiet place where the search for truth by earnest, dedicated men goes on in a dignified atmosphere.").
107. See Douglas, supra note 43, at 5; Gaines & Stuplinski, supra note 6, at 298 ("The function of a trial ... is 'not to provide an educational experience,' but to resolve the dispute between the parties in conformity with constitutional standards and with concern for procedural and substantive fairness.") (quoting Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 575 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concurring)).
108. See Juo. CoNF. REP., supra note 40, at 5-9 (Noting the threat of cameras in the courtroom to human rights, privacy, and the search for truth, and concluding that the ban on photography and broadcasting in federal court proceedings should not be lifted); Douglas, supra note 43, at 5 (Justice Douglas opposing extension of photography, television, and broadcasting into the courtroom, arguing that they would transform a trial into "as much of a spectacle as if it were held in the Yankee Stadium or the Roman Coliseum"); Corry, Rape Trial Covered Live by
Ill. STATE GUIDELINES AND THE NEED FOR UNIFORMITY
A. Major Areas Differentiating State Guidelines
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States experimenting with televised trials have adopted guidelines to direct their judges confronted with requests to televise. These guidelines represent varying accommodations of the constitutional and policy interests outlined in Parts I and II. The substantive differences among the guidelines lie in several areas: (1) the effect of an objection from a litigant or witness on the decision whether to televise the trial or the objector's testimony; (2) whether the jury should be televised; (3) whether certain types of trials should be off-limits to broadcasters; ( 4) procedural rules including whether there should be review of the pretrial decision allowing or excluding cameras; and (5) the extent to which broadcasters should be subject to an obligation of balanced reporting. Some of these guideline provisions are discussed below; others are simply included in the proposed model guidelines without discussion because they are technical rules that most states have adopted and found successful.
Consent
State guidelines vary as to whether parties or witnesses can preclude broadcasting of their testimony or the entire trial. The best compromise of the various rules is that presented by the District of Columbia committee evaluating cameras in the courtroom. 109 This committee suggests that no party would be granted the unilateral right to prevent broadcasters from televising trial proceedings. Witnesses, on the other hand, would be given the power to preclude the televising of their testimony.110
In their initial experiments with cameras, many states granted the defendant a right to limit or preclude broadcasting in order to provide maximum protection for the nonconsenting defendant. Although seven states still require the defendant's consent as an absolute precondition for televising a criminal trial, 111 most states have rejected this 111. See RTNDA, supra note 3, at B-10. An "absolute" precondition means that the party's refusal precludes the televising of any portion of the trial. A "limited" precondition means that the party's refusal precludes the televising of his or her testimony only. The following data lists the number of states that place absolute or limited preconditions on the televising of their criminal trials: Witness' consent is an absolute precondition (1 state); witness' consent is a limited precondition (14 states); juror's consent is an absolute precondition (0 states); juror's consent is a limited precondition (7 states); defendant's consent is an absolute precondition (7 states); defendant's consent is a limited precondition (3 states); prosecutor's consent is an absolute precondition (5 states); prosecutor's consent is a limited precondition (0 states). requirement. Those states rejecting it found that, contrary to the intent of the experiment, a defendant's consent requirement effectively barred the televising of all trials. 112 While it is disturbing to deprive the defendant of a veto because of practical considerations, certain limitations on the media, to be discussed below, can ensure that television does not deprive the defendant of a fair trial. These include: (1) prohibiting filming of the jury; 113 (2) prohibiting broadcasting of certain sensitive trials; 114 (3) requiring a pretrial hearing)n which the defendant can raise objections; 115 and (4) granting the accused a pretrial right to appeal a decision to allow cameras. 116 \ Conversely, fourteen states wisely allow witnesses to bai\ the televising of their own testimony. 117 States justify the distinction between witnesses and defendants by noting the differences in circumstances leading to their attendance in court. The District of Columbia committee points out that "certain witnesses, such as victims of violent crimes, police informants, and defense witnesses who are reluctant to 'get involved' with the criminal process, will be adversely affected if their testimony is televised." 118 Television coverage, it is argued, may increase the risk that these witnesses will become "unavailable" or will alter their testimony. 119 Defendants, on the other hand, will be present for trial despite any reluctance to be televised. 120 Moreover, any incentive on the part of the defendant to fabricate testimony arises from the defendant's predicament, not from the presence of cameras. Therefore, television coverage of the defendant's testimony does not threaten the same damage to the criminal justice system as does the televising of a witness' testimony.121
Some states provide that a judge may in his discretion prohibit tel- 121. The notion that witnesses in criminal trials must be encouraged to come forward and offer their testimony is not a novel one. The Victim and Witnesses Protection Act § 4(a), 18 U.S.C. § § 1512-15 (1982) , is but one example of a statute designed to encourage witnesses to testify in criminal cases.
Some commentators also contend that witnesses deserve extra protection because they retain more of their right to privacy than do defendants. See Tongue & Lintott, The Case Against evision coverage of an objecting witness upon a showing of good cause by the witness. 122 A fiat rule requiring judges to ban the televising of an objecting witness' testimony 123 is preferable because it enables attorneys to assure reluctant witnesses before trial that they will not be televised against their will. 124 Such prior assurance will increase the likelihood of gaining the cooperation of witnesses which is so critical to the criminal justice process.
Limitations on Broadcasting the Jury
Filming the jury, during the trial and during voir dire, poses such serious dangers that it should be banned. 125 Televising the jury can impinge on its impartiality and thus threaten the fairness of the trial. Those who view jurors on television may harass them, attempting to influence their decision. 126 By causing an increase in outside pressure, broadcasting can enable public opinion to become an "unwanted and powerful thirteenth juror."121
Another concern is that broadcasting will distract the jury, both inside and outside the courtroom. Inside, the jurors' attention may be distracted by the physical noise of the cameras or the mere knowledge that they are being filmed. 128 Outside, the jurors may be tempted to watch themselves. on television, despite the judge's order not to read or printed media, causes a person to feel more knowledgeable about the trial and leads to stronger opinions concerning the 'correct' outcome. It is a near certainty the jurors will be approached by such people and will become engaged in discussions about the trial.").
127. Note, supra note 57, at 928; see also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 351 (1966) ("The theory of our system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court and not by any outside influence, whether of private talk or public print.") (quoting Justice Holmes in Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) [Vol. 84:475 watch reports of the trial. 12 9 Jurors who watch the broadcast may learn of evidence not admitted or see facts presented in a different light. At a minimum, they will receive additional exposure to those facts deemed most significant by the broadcasters. Such pollution of the fact-finding process raises grave policy and constitutional concerns. Furthermore, televising the jury during the trial may invade the jurors' legitimate interest in privacy. 130 Of all the trial participants, jurors are most likely to be in court involuntarily. Jurors performing their civic duty should not have to be exposed to public scrutiny. Such exposure is of special concern with regard to voir dire, since judges (and in some states attorneys) often question jurors regarding highly personal matters.13 1 Jurors may be required to reveal, for example, information about their past associations or criminal behavior. The jurors' privacy is thus more easily threatened by the televising of voir dire proceedings in which they are active participants than by the broadcasting of a trial in which they are silent spectators. The set of model guidelines should therefore incorporate the rule already adopted by nine states prohibiting the televising of voir dire proceedings. 132 that jurors are not distracted by the presence of cameras, see CAL. REPORT, supra note 58, at 228; Fla. Report, supra note 3, at 768-69; LA. REPORT, supra note 58, at 2.
129. See note 85 supra and accompanying text.
130. Courts have recognized a juror's privacy interest as a valid concern that must be safe· guarded. The defendant, the state, and the juror herself may all share this interest. Recently, Justice Blackmun explained these interests, stating:
[T]he defendant has an interest in protecting juror privacy in order to encourage honest answers to the voir dire questions. The State has a similar interest in protecting juror privacy even after the trial -to encourage juror honesty in the future -that almost always will be coextensive with the juror's own privacy interest. 501, 505-10 (1984) . However, the Court merely established a presumption of openness; it refused to adopt a fiat rule mandating a right of access to voir dire A ban on televising the jury is further supported by the fact that the benefits of broadcasting are few in the jury context. Televising the jury watching the trial contributes little to the public's understanding of judicial proceedings. 133 In addition, filming of the jury in voir dire proceedings or at trial does little to advance the goal of judicial oversight. To protect truly against a "miscarriage of justice," 134 the public would need to witness the actual deliberations of the jury. Neither the televising of voir dire nor the broadcasting of jurors viewing the trial would enlighten the public as to whether the jury was adequately performing its assigned role.
Most states that permit cameras impose some restrictions on televising members of the jury. Some prohibit televising the jury altogether, 135 while others prohibit filming in such a way that individual jurors are recognizable. 136 This rule prohibiting close-ups or "zooming in" on individual jurors offers some protection against outside pressure and interferences with privacy, and may curtail the juror's urge to watch the trial on television. However, reports have shown that this partial restriction is technologically difficult to implement. 137 Therefore, a total ban on jury broadcasting is more likely to guarantee an impartial jury and protect jurors' privacy.
Limitations on Televising Highly Sensitive Trials
The broadcasting media should be excluded from certain types of highly sensitive trials, 1 3 8 such as juvenile proceedings, 139 domestic reproceedings. Morever, as evidenced by the Court's decision not to extend Richmond Newspapers to the electronic media, see notes 32-36 supra and accompanying text, openness to the public does not necessarily mean that television coverage cannot be restricted.
133. See Note, supra note 25, at 422 ("[P]hotographing the jury does not educate the public nor does such coverage help monitor the courts -it is exposure for exposure's sake .... The state's strong interest in protecting the jury from outside influence coupled with the negligible first amendment interests involved clearly justify banning the photographing of juries.").
134. See note 98 supra and accompanying text.
135. States that completely prohibit television coverage of the jury include Arkansas, Connecticut, Hawaii, Minnesota, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio and Utah. RTNDA, supra note 3, at B-10 to B-11. 136. States that allow coverage of the jury but only in a manner that will prevent recognition of individual jurors include Arizona, California, Colorado, Kansas, Massachusetts, and New Jersey. RTNDA, supra note 3, at B-17 to B-18.
137. See CAL. REPORT, supra note 58, at 231. 138. It should be noted that states that bar the media from sensitive criminal trials employ similar justifications to bar the media from especially sensitive civil trials. Thus, eight states bar the media from adoption proceedings, eleven states bar the media from child custody proceedings, and eleven states bar the media from divorce proceedings. RTNDA, supra note 3, at B-19 to B-21. Accordingly, the model guidelines proposed by this Note provide that the media should be precluded from televising all sensitive trials, whether criminal or civil. See Appendix, section II (b) , infra.
139. Thirteen states prohibit the televising of juvenile proceedings. See RTNDA, supra note 3, at B-21; see also Geis, Publicity and Juvenile Court Proceedings, 30 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 101, [Vol. 84:475 lations disputes, and sexual offenses, 140 in order to protect the privacy of the participants. 141 Many state guidelines either mandate such an exclusion or state a presumption 142 that such broadcasting should be prohibited. Other states leave the decision solely to the discretion of the judge. 143 Guidelines should require courts to exclude cameras from certain highly sensitive trials for the same reasons that they completely close them to the public and the print media. 144 Closing a trial may spare a witness, especially one who is a victim, embarrassment, harassment, or reprisal. Because trials involving sexual offenses typically raise sensitive and personal matters, many courts exclude spectators at least during the victim's testimony. 145 Judges presiding over trials involving children have also taken extra precautions. 146 Indeed, there are a variety of protections afforded children -including the closure of juvenile proceedings 147 -that acknowledge that children are more easily . scarred than adults both by crimes in which they are involved and by ceedings"); Note, supra note 25, at 421-22 ("[A] uthorities regard the confidentiality of juvenile proceedings as indispensable to the successful functioning of the juvenile system.").
140. Eight states prohibit the televising of sexual offense trials. See RTNDA, supra note 3, at B-23; see also D.C. REPORT, supra note 77, at 7, 21-22 (arguing that no television coverage should be allowed in cases, such as sexual offense trials, which will likely invade litigants' privacy interests); Fla. Report, supra note 3, at 779 (arguing that it might be appropriate to prohibit the filming of sex crime victims, confidential informants, prisoners, and those involved in custody disputes).
141. See D.C. REPORT, supra note 77, at 21-22 (discussing the types of trials most likely to invade the participants' privacy interests); see also State v. Gilroy, 313 N.W.2d 513, 517 (Iowa 1981 ) (upholding exclusion from expanded media coverage of witness undercover agents in order to protect "effective and necessary Jaw enforcement processes").
142. States that have a presumption rule include Maryland and Wisconsin. See RTNDA, supra note 3, at B-20.
143. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 123 Ariz. 243, 599 P.2d 199 (1979) (court excluded spectators during victim's testimony); State v. Santos, 413 A.2d 58 (R.I. 1980 ) (temporary exclusion of all spectators permissible during testimony of rape victim).
In the New Bedford rape case, see note 96 supra, the judge ruled that neither the print nor the broadcast media could photograph the victim or reveal her name. Corry, supra note 108, at C22.
Instead, viewers were to hear only the victim's "voice, flat and unemotional, responding to questions." Id. Unfortunately, the judge's ruling was inadvertently violated; because the coverage was live, the broadcaster was unable to prevent the transmission of the victim's name when it was spoken in open court. See Friendly, supra note 96, at C22. This highlights how difficult limited exclusion is to administer and the need to supervise the broadcast to ensure compliance with the judge's orders. See Boy, 7, Is Witness in Child Abuse Case, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1985, at A9, col. 1 (spectators ordered to watch child's testimony on closed-circuit television; child's name edited out of the videotape). See generally Annot., 14 A.L.R.4th 121 § § 2b, 7c (1982) .
146.
147. Most states close juvenile court proceedings to the public, relying heavily on the importance of the privacy rights of the child. Sees. Fox, JUVENILE COURTS IN A NUTSHELL 184-87 (1984) . The constitutionality of complete closure of juvenile proceedings is very much in doubt in light of Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) . See note 75 supra. However, the fact that some access to juvenile proceedings may be required under certain cir-the judicial process itself.148
Permitting the broadcasting of sensitive trials also creates broader crime-control problems. Victims of sexual offenses, for example, may opt not to report or prosecute crimes if they believe they will be televised at trial. 149 To encourage these victims to prosecute their attackers, guidelines are needed that require judges not to permit the televising of particularly sensitive trials. 150
Although courts desire to make such decisions on a case-by-case basis, 151 leaving decisions to the judge's discretion subjects the victim's privacy interests to the whim of the judge. In Florida, for example, judges have refused requests not to be televised made by a widow of a murder victim, a prisoner in fear of retaliation, and a sixteen-year-old rape victim, on the ground that television broadcasting would not have a qualitatively different effect than newspaper reports. 152 These examples (especially the last) demonstrate the injustices made possible when judges, insensitive to the legitimate privacy concerns of litigants, are not constrained by rules mandating that privacy be protected. 153
The Supreme Court has ruled on this issue regarding the print me- 
Procedural Safeguards
Many state guidelines provide rules about notice -both that the court receive notice of a request to televise well before the actual trial date, 157 and that the court notify the parties of any request received. 158 The first requirement enables the judge, during the few days before the trial, to address substantive matters undistracted by any media-related issues. 159 The second requirement insures that the parties will not be surprised at trial by the broadcaster and will be prepared to raise any objections that, under Chandler v. Florida, they have a right to make at the pretrial hearing.160
In addition to requiring notice, guidelines should allow the defendant to make an interlocutory appeal of a pretrial decision to permit broadcasting. Until Chandler, the Supreme Court maintained that a post-trial appeal was a poor remedy for an accused. 161 However, the Chandler Court, while requiring that the defendant be given an opportunity to voice objections to coverage, 162 upheld Florida's rule under which the only opportunity to challenge the decision to televise was on appeal, 163 after any damage had already been done.
Chandler did acknowledge that coverage may adversely affect the conduct of trial participants and the fairness of the trial without leaving evidence that such prejudice occurred. 1 64 It thus may be impossible to prove after the fact that a trial was unfair as a result of the 156. See United States v. Kerley, 753 F.2d 617, 620-21 (7th Cir. 1985 164. Inherent in electronic coverage of a trial is the risk that the very awareness by the accused of the coverage and the contemplated broadcast may adversely affect the conduct of the participants and the fairness of the trial, yet leave no evidence of how the conduct or the trial's fairness was affected. 449 U.S. at 577.
broadcasting. Nonetheless, the Court placed the burden on the defendant to prove that the televising was prejudicial. 165 This difficult burden is made even more onerous by the high standard of appellate review of discretionary trial court decisions. 1 66 Limiting the defendant's relief to a post-conviction appeal may thus offer little benefit to the defendant whose conviction has already been broadcast nationwide.167 Although interlocutory appeals can crowd appellate court dockets and delay trials, they are warranted when legitimate claims may be jeopardized if not heard and appealed before trial. 168
The District of Columbia Bar report recommends a rule under which a party would have the right to an interlocutory appeal of a pretrial decision allowing coverage, but the media and nonparties would be denied a similar right to appeal a pretrial decision barring coverage. 169 Prohibiting interlocutory appeal on a decision to bar the media reduces the delay before the trial. 170 The compromise also shows proper deference for the accused over the interests of the media.171 Few would doubt that the damage to. the defendant of an improper decision allowing cameras is greater than the damage to the public of the converse decision. The public will learn of the trial from newspapers and television reports even without the live broadcast. 172 165. 449 U.S. at 575, 581-83. 166. See Lasley v. State, 274 Ark. 352, 357, 625 S.W.2d 466, 469 (1981) . 167. D.C. REPORT, supra note 77, at 19, 20. Few state guidelines discuss the interlocutory appeal issue. Some states explicitly deny the defendant or the media the right to appeal the court's determination before trial. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. l IOA, § 6l(c)(24) (Smith-Hurd 1985) , amended by In re Photographing, Broadcasting, and Televising Proceedings in the Courts of Illinois, MR No. 2634 (Nov. 29, 1983 ) (adopted on a permanent basis by order entered Jan. 22, 1985) ; In re Canon 3A(7), 9 MEDIA L. REP. 1778, 1779 (Minn. 1983) . at 42 (The public is being adequately informed about criminal prosecutions by newspaper coverage and the filming outside the precincts of the courtroom. Journalists have always been free to report the most minute details and events of a trial. Excluding cameras from the courtroom will not infringe upon the public's right to know about criminal prosecutions.).
Some challenge this argument on the ground that it discriminates against broadcasters in favor of the print media. See Ares, supra note 32, at 175-78. This complaint was effectively countered in Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965) , where the court argued that the "television and radio reporter has the same privilege. All are entitled to the same rights as the general [Vol. 84:475 
Limitations on Reporting
Distortion in reporting trials is a serious concern with broadcasting.113 Some fear that trials will be presented in a fashion most likely to entertain. 174 Others fear that broadcasters will, as in Chandler v. Florida, 115 present only one side of the case, thereby distorting the public's understanding of the proceeding and reducing the educational value of the broadcast.116
Given the length of many trials and the high cost of television time, a requirement that the entire trial be broadcast is probably unrealistic.177 On the other hand, a requirement of balanced reporting is both realistic and appropriate. Admittedly, such a restriction would probably be unconstitutional as applied to the print media. 178 However, the difference in impact between the two media 179 justifies a requirement that broadcasters offer a balanced presentation of criminal trials.
A requirement of balanced reporting that applies only to broadcasting is not foreign to our system of media regulation. For example, the federal election laws require that " [i] 367, 378-79 (1969) ; see also Bollinger, supra note 79, at 274-75; Zimmerman, supra note 35, at 642-43. The fairness doctrine received the print media. 183 Such provisions acknowledge the differences between the two kinds of media and accordingly provide stricter rules to ensure balanced reporting by television broadcasters. 184 A balanced reporting provision should require broadcasters to express the arguments of both the defendant and the prosecution. It need not require strict equal time in reporting as imposed on television by the election laws, 185 because this would prove unworkable in a judicial proceeding. For example, it might not be clear to broadcasters which side a particular witness' testimony will ultimately benefit. In addition broadcasters would have to decide how many minutes to devote to the prosecutor's case without knowing the length of the defendant's presentation. Nonetheless, a general requirement of balanced reporting would help eliminate the most egregious distortions of criminal trials; distortions that can jeopardize the fairness of the trial and minimize the public's opportunity to understand the judicial process. Media, 26 HAsTINGS L.J. 659, 665-91 (1975) .
184. Several theories are offered to justify the disparate treatment of newspapers and television. See generally Bollinger, supra note 79. One theory is that the airwaves are a limited resource, such that only a certain number of stations can effectively communicate at any given time. Thus regulations should be imposed to ensure that the few stations that do have the privilege to broadcast do not present the public with a one-sided view of important issues. See Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400 (1969) (adopting the "physical scarcity" rationale). But see Bollinger, supra note 79, at 273 ("[Ejverything is scarce, including all those things used by newspapers and magazines for that particular form of communication (newsprint, metal and the like).") (emphasis in original). A second theory asserted is that broadcasters are public trustees and fiduciaries and thus should be regulated in the public interest. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 383, 389-90. A third justification for regulation is known as the "impact" thesis, which asserts that television messages have a subliminal impact that can undermine viewers' rationality and make the message seem more believable than if read. that, of all media, television is suspected of having the greatest impact on the largest audience). Finally, some courts justify restrictions as necessary to protect viewers who are in certain respects a "captive audience." See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) ; Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Natl. Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 127 (1973) . This rationale is closely related to the assertion that because the television set is located in the home, a place in which the privacy interests of the audience are entitled to extra deference, heightened regulation is required to ensure the propriety of the broadcasting material. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749 & n.27.
185. See note 180 supra and accompanying text. [Vol. 84:475 in controversy in debates over media access. Reports from states experimenting with televised trials have found that such rules help minimize distractions and thus serve to provide fairer trials.186 Examples of technical rules include (1) prohibiting the changing of camera lenses during the trial; (2) requiring media pooling so that only one camera is in the courtroom at any given time; (3) requiring camerapersons to dress appropriately for the proceeding; and (4) prohibiting insignias on either the cameras or clothes of the broadcasters that identify the station. 187 Judge Murray Richtel, chairman of the National Conference of State Trial Judges committee responsible for drafting model rules for electronic coverage of trials, 188 favors the additional requirement that photographers remain in the courtroom throughout the proceedings: "I [want] them to stay because if the jurors [see] them coming and going they might [be] given the impression that one part of the trial [is] more important than the other .... " 1 89
B. The Merits of a Uniform Set of Guidelines
All states should adopt the model guidelines proposed in the Appendix to this Note, not only because they properly balance the conflicting constitutional and policy interests involved in the cameras in the courtroom debate, but also because uniformity in this area is itself a worthy goal.
In contrast to the rules governing civil procedure, 190 there is currently no uniform set of rules of criminal procedure generally accepted by most states. 191 Nonetheless, efforts have been made in this direction. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) adopted uniform rules of criminal procedure in 1974. 192 Other groups such as the American Law Institute and Amer-ican Bar Association have also promulgated draft codes, rules and standards in an effort to improve state rules of criminal procedure. 1 9 3 There are three advantages of a uniform set of rules for cameras in state criminal trials. First, they would ensure fairness; second, they would promote judicial efficiency; and third, they would benefit those broadcasters that operate across interstate lines. The principal objection to uniform rules, that federalism might be threatened, is not sufficiently certain or compelling to outweigh the benefits.
First, uniform rules would serve to ensure fairness in criminal trials by treating those accused consistently from state to state. 194 Uniform rules of procedure regarding the broadcasting of trials would raise the visibility of the cameras in the courtroom issue, provide certainty of procedures, and help eliminate the perception of arbitrary actions by the courts. Uniform rules would also help prevent "favoritism, corruption, and local prejudice."t9s Second, the adoption of one set of rules to govern televised trials would promote judicial efficiency. With only one set of state guidelines to construe, the Supreme Court and other appellate tribunals could more easily assure compliance with first, sixth, and fourteenth amendment requirements. 196 If the Supreme Court were to uphold the uniform set of rules, as it did the Florida guidelines in Chandler, 197 the number of appeals would be reduced. Parties could still challenge the interpretation and application of the rules (e.g., argue that the judge abused his or her discretion), but could no longer challenge the validity of the rules themselves. Efficiency would also be increased in the separate states. As the uniform guidelines became more accepted, states considering cameras in the courtroom would not have to conduct their own experiments and evaluations. 198 Instead, they could be assured that the guidelines worked merely by the number of states using them successfully.
Third, uniform rules offer benefits to broadcasters. Almost all current state guidelines consist of complex rules containing both procedural requirements and technical rules regulating equipment. The major broadcasters are interstate networks and are likely to be interested in broadcasting trials in various states. Under the current system, the network must carefully study the guidelines of the particular ence in the model rules to broadcasting appears in section 714(e), which provides that sound and visual recordings of closed trial proceedings may be shown publicly after the trial. Id. at 319. [ Vol. 84:475 state in which it seeks to televise. Given the variety of equipment specifications, this may entail using certain equipment in one state and different equipment in others. Notice requirements also differ markedly from state to state; the time period within which a broadcaster must file a request to televise ranges from one day in advance of trial in Colorado, 1 99 to fourteen days in advance of trial in Iowa, 200 to a "reasonable time before" trial in California. 201 A uniform set of guidelines would ease these burdens by requiring stations to master only one set of rules.
The most commonly asserted challenge to uniformity is that it threatens federalism. Imposed uniformity diminishes the value of states as laboratories for the development of innovative approaches and overrides values that are the primary responsibilities of the states. 202 Indeed, in Chandler the Supreme Court explicitly lauded the value of state experimentation in this area. 20 3 There are two responses to this concern. First, federalism will not be impaired because the rules, rather than being imposed by constitutional amendment or judicial fiat, will be available for states to adopt or reject. 204 The Supreme Court's desire to encourage state experimentation does not mean that it disapproves of a state's informed decision to adopt rules similar to those used in other states. Second, the fact that the Supreme Court in Chandler has taken a states' rights approach and praised the benefits of experimentation does not mean that its position is immune .to challenge. 205 In fact, the Chandler view represents a switch in the Court's position regarding state activities that involve constitutional rights. 206 When constitutional rights have been implicated in the past, the Court has prescribed criminal procedure rules that states must follow to insure the protection of those rights. 207 Thus, the Court has required specific safeguards against improper confessions, 208 illegal searches, 20 9 and denial of counsel. 210 Proponents of the pre-Chandler approach in situations involving constitutional rights properly view uniformity as a desirable solution to the Court's refusal to promulgate guidelines in this area.
CONCLUSION
In the last two decades there has been an explosion in the number of states that permit televising of their criminal trials. The Supreme Court, while not endorsing this development, has allowed it to occur. But the Court's hesitant position, along with the ever-present federal ban against televising federal criminal trials, has left states without guidance as to the proper way to accommodate the various constitutional and policy interests of the trial participants, media, and public. As a result, there are almost as many variations in guidelines as there are states allowing coverage. Uniformity is needed.
The absence of a first amendment right of television access on the one hand, and the potential of broadcasting to impair the fairness of the trial and invade the privacy interests of trial participants and jurors on the other hand, suggest that any state that permits televised [Vol. 84:475 trials should be cautious not to give the media too much latitude once in the courtroom. The model guidelines proposed in the Appendix to this Note strike the proper balance between the conflicting interests and should therefore be considered by any state permitting or experimenting with television coverage of its criminal trials.
APPENDIX PROPOSED MODEL GUIDELINES
Subject at all times to the authority of the Judge to (i) control the conduct of proceedings before the Court; (ii) ensure decorum and prevent distractions; and (iii) ensure the fair administration of justice in the pending case, electronic media and still photography coverage of public judicial proceedings in the Courts of this state may be allowed in accordance with standards of conduct and technology adopted by the Supreme Court of ____ .
(I) DEFINITIONS "Judicial proceedings" or "proceedings" as referred to in these rules shall include all public trials, hearings or other proceedings in a trial or appellate court, for which expanded media coverage is requested, except those specifically excluded by these rules.
"Expanded media coverage" includes broadcasting, televising, electronic recording or photographing of judicial proceedings for the purpose of gathering and disseminating news to the public.
"Judge" means the magistrate, district associate judge, or district judge presiding in a trial court proceeding or the presiding judge or justice in an appellate proceeding.
(II) STANDARDS FOR AUTHORIZING COVERAGE (a) The judge has discretion to allow or deny expanded media coverage. In making that decision, the judge should consider the following factors: 1. whether there is a reasonable likelihood that expanded media coverage would interfere with the rights of the parties to a fair trial; or 2. whether there is a reasonable likelihood that expanded media coverage would unduly detract from the solemnity, decorum and dignity of the court. (b) There shall be no expanded media coverage of any court proceeding which, under the laws of the state of are required to be held in private. Additionally, no such coverage shall be permitted in any cases involving sex crimes, juvenile proceedings, marriage dissolution, adoption, child custody, motions to suppress evidence, police informants, undercover agents, and trade secrets, unless consent on the record is obtained from all parties (including the parent or guardian of a minor child). 212 (Ill) LIAISON The Administrative Director of the Courts shall maintain communication and liaison with media representatives so as to insure smooth working relationships. 213 
